INTRODUCTION
Recognising the importance of species diversity in conserving and exploiting plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, international and domestic arrangements have attempted over the decades in situ conservation, ex situ germplasm collections and germplasm exchange mechanisms. 1 These initiatives established valuable resources for the development of new crop and forage plant varieties but there were no uniform or binding arrangements for conserving and accessing these resources. A more formal and uniform arrangement to both facilitate the conservation and exchange of some crop and forage plant genetic materials and share the benefits is now addressed in the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture ('PGRFA Treaty'). 2 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations The World Trade Organization's ('WTO') Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ('TRIPS') 10 setting, in part, minimum standards for patents and a sui generis scheme for plant inventions, now reflected in domestic Australian legislation as 'exclusive rights' under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ('Patents Act') 11 and the Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth) ('Plant Breeder's Rights Act'). 12 The place of intellectual property rights is central to economic theory about allocating the scarce resources necessary to both conserve and efficiently exploit plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, 13 with an assumption of overall economic benefit while at the same time having minimal social costs. 14 Theoretically these intellectual property rights compensate for the disincentive to innovate with a limited 
11
The Patents (World Trade Organization Amendments) Act 1994 (Cth) amended the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) to be consistent with TRIPS by extending the patent term to 20 years, onus requirements for infringement proceedings, compulsory licenses and Commonwealth and State use of a patent; the statutory 'exclusive rights' under the Patents Act are, 'during the term of the patent, to exploit the invention and to authorise another person to exploit the invention' (Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(1)); these rights are 'personal property' that is 'capable of assignment and of devolution by law' (Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(2)); the term 'exploit', 'in relation to an invention, includes: (a) where the invention is a product -make, hire, sell or otherwise dispose of the product, offer to make, sell, hire or otherwise dispose of it, use or import it, or keep it for the purpose of doing any of those things; or (b) where the invention is a method or process -use the method or process or do any act mentioned in paragraph (a) in respect of a product resulting from such use': Patents Act 1990 (Cth) sch 1. ; the statutory 'exclusive rights' under the Plant Breeder's Rights Act 1994 (Cth) are 'to do, or to license another person to do, the following acts in relation to propagating material of the variety: (a) produce or reproduce the material; (b) condition the material for the purpose of propagation; (c) offer the material for sale; (d) sell the material; (e) import the material; (f) export the material; (g) stock the material for the purposes described in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f)' (s 11), except private and non-commercial purpose acts (s 16(a)), experimental purposes (s 16(b)), the breeding of other plant varieties (s 16(c)) and conditioning for 'reproductive purposes' or reproduction (such as farm saved seeds): s 17. 13 This is an ongoing debate between at least two different views about the benefits of intellectual property rights: one view emphasises the need for more intellectual property rights to encourage more innovation, and the contrary 'monopoly distortions' view emphasises the costs of intellectual property rights as extracting too high a cost through monopoly distortion in the market; see generally Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, period of exclusivity that enables the innovator to recover the development costs (confounding the free riders). 15 This compensation therefore encourages other beneficial innovation through investment in new developments (with the added benefit of disclosure of the innovation). 16 Given that the conservation and exploitation of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture are vital to Australia's agricultural and environmental circumstances 17 (and ensuring future global food security), 18 intellectual property rights arguably address a possible market failure and procure the investment necessary to conserve, exploit and generate the new and improved plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. 19 However, the interaction between the PGRFA Treaty, the CBD and TRIPS as they apply to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and the role of intellectual property rights in and between these schemes remains unsettled.
This paper sets out to examine the consequences for Australia's agricultural policy settings for intellectual property arrangements over plant genetic resources for food and agriculture under the PGRFA Treaty and the CBD. This involves examining the conflict between accessing plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (predominantly germplasm) for crop and forage plant improvement and meeting the policy objectives of intellectual property laws to promote innovation and economically useful investment that privately appropriates these resources. The international schemes for access to genetic resources and intellectual property rights set out in the PGRFA Treaty, the CBD and TRIPS, provide a complicated patchwork for domestic policy makers. In domestic Australian laws these international arrangements are reflected in patents under the Patents Act and plant breeder's rights ('PBR') under the Plant Breeder's Rights Act, and the consequences of these statutory rights schemes in setting agricultural policy that satisfies Australia's commercial and environmental circumstances, as well as meeting its obligations under the PGRFA Treaty, the CBD and TRIPS.
The paper is structured as follows:
Such as, 'the uncertainty of payoff from R&D and innovative activity' and 'the limited ability of the inventor/innovator to appropriate profits arising from the use of the new knowledge generated': see ibid 12; Bureau of Industry Economics, ' Part 2 outlines the PGRFA Treaty establishing a legally binding agreement for the conservation and exchange of certain listed plant genetic resources for food and agriculture through a Multilateral System of 'facilitated access'. In essence, the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture forming the Multilateral System under the PGRFA Treaty are accessible to Contracting Parties under standard materials transfer agreements ('MTAs') subject to a number of mandatory conditions, including the restriction that any patents and PBRs cannot be claimed over materials accessed from the Multilateral System while it remains 'in the form received from the Multilateral System'. 20 In the negotiation of the intellectual property provisions in the PGRFA Treaty Australia's stance was that it be able to continue to exercise its existing intellectual property rights in accordance with domestic and international law, and in particular the claiming of intellectual property rights over any genetic material 'which meets relevant standards', 21 consistent with the minimum standards required by TRIPS. The likely consequence of this stance in Australia is that materials that cease to be 'in the form received from the Multilateral System' and that were originally accessed from the Multilateral System will be privately appropriated and removed from the Multilateral System through patents and PBRs. Related materials may also be appropriated as a consequence of patenting practices that allow broader claims than just the 'invented' materials;
Part 3 reviews the likely interaction between TRIPS and the CBD's scheme for access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and benefit-sharing. This remains a significant interaction until the PGRFA Treaty enters into force. The CBD currently applies to all dealings with plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and will continue to apply to all other plant genetic resources for food and agriculture that have not been included in the PGRFA Treaty's Multilateral System. These analyses find that the CBD is likely to apply subject to the minimum standards required by TRIPS so that countries seeking the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the use of their genetic resources will be required to respect minimum intellectual property standards. Again, the likely consequence for Australia is the private appropriation of the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture; Part 4 contends that the future technological solutions in Australia's agricultural landscape will include both classical breeding techniques and the applications of modern genetic techniques. Both these technological approaches require access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture that will be sourced primarily from existing ex situ collections, in situ crop and forage plants predominantly maintained by farmers in developing countries, and the wild relatives of domesticated plants. Intellectual property rights are likely to have a significant role in the ways these resources are exploited and conserved. The most important difference being patents privately appropriate plant genetic resources for food and agriculture for the term of the patent, while PBR provides a more limited appropriation and expressly allows the resource to be used to develop new varieties. This presents a dilemma for Australia's policy makers, as Australia's agricultural landscape requires access to these plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. Patents are likely to further confound Australia's agricultural landscape through the need for complex negotiation with private rights See below, text accompanying n 39.
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Volume 32 ____________________________________________________________________________________ holders to access essential patented products and processes and the potentially adverse consequences of market concentration in particular agricultural sectors. Significantly, these patents are held predominantly by non-residents that in most circumstances will have an interest in avoiding competition in their domestic and foreign markets from Australian products. These patents and PBRs are also likely to undermine the objectives of the PGRFA Treaty, which seeks to provide 'facilitated access' to its Multilateral System, and the incentive for those holding valuable plant genetic resources for food and agriculture to contribute them to the Multilateral System. With an ineffective PGRFA Treaty, through a depletion of its useful materials, a failure of Contracting Parties to contribute materials to the Multilateral System or a failure to enter into force, the CBD scheme is likely to be the default scheme requiring the more onerous process of mutually agreed terms, prior informed consent and so on for access to important plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. The paper concludes that Australia's best interests are probably in achieving a successful PGRFA Treaty and reconsidering its stance in negotiating the implementation of the PGRFA Treaty to ensure access to key plant genetic resources for food and agriculture essential to Australia's agricultural competitiveness.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE PGRFA TREATY
The PGRFA Treaty establishes a Multilateral System for access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, 22 subject to benefit sharing arrangements, 23 and recognising the 'sovereign rights of States over their own plant genetic resources for food and agriculture'. 24 The objective of the PGRFA Treaty is 'the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use, in harmony with the CBD, for sustainable agriculture and food security'. 25 The term 'plant genetic resources for food and agriculture' is broadly defined, 26 although in the context of the PGRFA Treaty it is confined to materials included in the Multilateral System that are the list of food crops and forages set out in Annex 1 (see Table 1 ). 27 This is further limited as these materials must also be 'under the management and control of the Contracting Parties and in the public domain'. 28 The ex situ collections of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research ('CGIAR') system of International Agricultural Research Centres 29 and contributions by other resource holders 30 also form part of the Multilateral System. Article 10(1).
23
Article 10(2).
24
Article 10(1).
25
Article 1(1).
26
Meaning 'any genetic material of plant origin of actual or potential value for food and agriculture' (art 2); the term 'genetic material' is defined to mean 'any material of plant origin, including reproductive and vegetative propagating material, containing functional units of heredity': art 2.
27
Article 11(1).
28
Article 11(2). The materials forming the Multilateral System are accessible to Contracting Parties under standard MTAs between the Governing Body and the accessing party. 31 The PGRFA Treaty imposes a number of mandatory conditions in these MTAs, 32 including restrictions on claiming intellectual property rights:
Recipients shall not claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, or their genetic parts or components, in the form received from the Multilateral System. 33 However, the meaning of this provision and its effect remain uncertain, particularly the meaning of the terms 'in the form received from the Multilateral System'. This ambiguity was reflected in the draft text, 34 and remained despite the reservations expressed during negotiations. 35 Australia's stance during these negotiations is instructive about its likely effect in practice and as an indication of how the Australian government is likely to implement its obligations under the PGRFA Treaty. 36 During negotiations, Australia commented about the place of intellectual property rights saying:
It will be important also to ensure that an appropriate balance is maintained between guaranteeing continued access to [plant genetic resources for food and agriculture] included in the Multilateral System, and preserving the ability of those carrying out research and development to adequately protect innovations developed using resources that have been accessed under the regime. In this regard, Australia supports the language contained in the second set of square-bracketed text ([in the form received]). 37 Australia then expressed some concern about the uncertainty of the language of the proposed intellectual property provision and problems in interpreting the text, and proposed an alternative text qualifying the terms 'in the form received from the Multilateral System': Article 11(2); note that Contracting Parties also agreed to 'take appropriate measures to encourage natural and legal persons within their jurisdiction who hold plant genetic resources for food and agriculture listed in Annex I' to include such materials in the Multilateral System (art 11(3)), subject to possibly excluding these persons from future access to the Multilateral System (see art 11(4)).
31
Article 12(4).
32
33
Article 12(3)(d); the MTA conditions are to apply to subsequent transfers of the Multilateral System's materials: art 12(4). 
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Volume 32 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Recipients shall not claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, including genetic parts and components, in the form received from the Multilateral System, acknowledging that genetic parts and components that have been modified, for example through isolation and purification, may be patentable provided that the criteria for patentability are met. 38 The justification for these suggestions was:
Australia's primary concern is to ensure that the final formulation of this provision is clear and enables Australia to continue to exercise its existing rights in accordance with domestic and international law. From an Australian perspective, it is essential that the final text allows continuation of our domestic policy permitting [ Ibid 21; as a measure of its reservations the United States had called for a majority vote on removing the intellectual property provision entirely, but this was defeated 97 votes opposed, ten votes in support and three abstentions; despite these concerns the PGRFA Treaty was adopted by 116 votes in favour and two abstentions (Japan and the United States); Japan abstained on the basis it would consult with its capital on the consistency of the PGRFA Treaty, and in particular the operation of the intellectual property provision, while the United States abstained on the bases that the intellectual property provision failed to protect intellectual property rights necessary to promote innovation, and its reservations about the ambiguous language of the PGRFA Treaty and a failure to include an essential security clause (for a report on the negotiation and voting see ETC Group, 'The Law of the Seed!' (2001) 3 Translator 1); the proposed United States' essential security provision: '[n]othing in this Undertaking shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party from taking any action that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests': CL 121/5-Sup.1, above n 35, 22); the United States later clarified that the absence of an essential security clause 'precluded' it from ever ratifying the PGRFA Treaty (with the effect of excluding the United States from further participation in the PGRFA Treaty's interim committee, although the United States has now signed the PGRFA Treaty (see The United States Mission to the United Nations Agencies in Rome, 'U.S. Signs the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture' (Statement, 1 November 2002)) saying:
As a signatory to the Treaty, the United States will actively participate in the development of a standard material transfer agreement under the aegis of the Treaty. The benefit-sharing and intellectual property rights of this material transfer agreement will likely create a de facto global standard for agreements on international exchanges of plant genetic resources. The United States seeks to ensure that this agreement will be simple to administer and that it will promote, not impede, international exchanges of plant genetic resources. The decision to proceed with U.S. ratification, however, will depend on the satisfactory resolution of outstanding issues related to benefit-sharing, intellectual property rights and financial responsibilities. The key intellectual property issue that remains unresolved is to what extent intellectual property rights may be claimed for plant genetic resources that have been originally accessed from the Multilateral System and the quantum of change necessary for materials accessed from the Multilateral System to cease to be 'in the form received from the Multilateral System'. This however, will be influenced by the interaction between the PGRFA Treaty and the CBD, and the likely application to the PGRFA Treaty of minimum standard intellectual property rights required by TRIPS.
The relationship between the PGRFA Treaty and the CBD remains to be determined by the Governing Body 44 and the Conference of the Parties to the CBD. 45 Presumably the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture accessed from the Multilateral System will substitute, where appropriate, 46 for the CBD's obligations of prior informed consent, mutually agreed terms, and so on. 47 This interpretation would be consistent with the PGRFA Treaty's attempt at 'facilitated access' to the Multilateral System's plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. 48 The Governing Body has not directly addressed the issue of the impact of intellectual property rights on the PGRFA Treaty at this stage, 49 although this issue goes to the heart of the PGRFA Treaty and is likely to be the determining factor in its entering into force as developed countries seek to privately appropriate the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture through intellectual property rights, and developing and least developed countries and ex situ collection holders (such as the CGIAR centres) seek adequate benefit-sharing and remuneration. 50 While Australia (like other developed countries including Japan and the United States) appears to support an interpretation that intellectual property rights may be claimed 'for genetic material which meets relevant standards', 51 other countries favour an interpretation that excludes intellectual property rights over any material obtained under the Multilateral System, even where the relevant standards in national legislation have 
Volume 32 ____________________________________________________________________________________ been satisfied. 52 However, its seems likely that for Contracting Parties (and the other donors such as the CGIAR centres) contributing materials to the Multilateral System, with the expectation of benefit-sharing in the Multilateral System, they will need to adopt and respect minimum standard intellectual property rights consistent with TRIPS. The PGRFA Treaty itself also appears to support this view.
During That is, the PGRFA Treaty would not change any existing obligations under the CBD and, most importantly TRIPS, as both the CBD and TRIPS have entered into force and bind Australia. The effect of this requirement is to impose the minimum patenting standards required by TRIPS. From Australia's perspective this presumably means that any change from 'in the form received from the Multilateral System' that satisfies the threshold criteria for patenting under the Patents Act or PBR under the Plant Breeder's Rights Act would be sufficient to satisfy both the PGRFA Treaty and TRIPS obligations.
In practice, the thresholds for patenting under the Patents Act or PBRs under the Plant Breeder's Rights Act are easily satisfied for biological materials so that statutory rights may be claimed over these plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and their parts and components, with very, very little change (whether innovation or breeding). 57 This is significant as patent claims and/or PBRs 58 over materials that cease to be 'in the form received from the Multilateral System' may in effect:
For example, Norway considers that '[g]iven the fact that the backbone of the multilateral system now is material in the public domain, it is even more important to avoid any possibilities of "leakage" of material (or options for use) from the system': ibid 17. 53 Ibid 7. 54 Ibid. 55 See CGRFA-Ex 6/01/REP, above n 34, app B(B5). 56 See ETC Group, above n 43, 3. Remove the patented or PBRed materials from the public domain or the management and control of the Contracting Party and so outside the PGRFA Treaty's Multilateral System. These materials will then no longer be subject to the PGRFA Treaty's 'facilitated access' scheme; Extend to the materials accessed from the Multilateral System, 59 as well as other materials within the Multilateral System, including materials that may only be vaguely related to the accessed materials, 60 where the patent broadly claims related materials; and Remove subsequent improvements to the materials that cease to be a part of the Multilateral System unless the patent or PBR holder (or their successors) again contributes the materials to the Multilateral System. The consequences of these arrangements for Australia's agricultural policy settings are considered further in Part 4. However, until the PGRFA Treaty enters into force, the CBD access scheme that deals with all genetic resources (except the ex situ collections before 29 December 1993) is the binding arrangement on Australia. Further, even after the PGRFA Treaty enters into force the CBD's scheme will apply to important crop and forage plants that do not form part of the PGRFA Treaty's Multilateral System. Table 2 sets out examples of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture that were expressly excluded from the Multilateral System during negotiation of the final PGRFA Treaty text. The effects of intellectual property rights under the CBD are therefore significant and an integral part of considering Australia's agricultural policy settings.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE CBD
The CBD has the objective of conserving biological diversity (which includes genetic diversity), its sustainable use and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding. The term 'genetic resources' is broadly defined to mean 'genetic material of actual or potential value' and 'genetic material' means 'any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity'. 62 Access to genetic resources is according to the authority of countries 63 with an obligation to facilitate access for 'environmentally sound uses' without imposing restrictions counter to the CBD's objectives. 64 Further, access must be from countries of origin or countries that have acquired the genetic resources according to the CBD, 65 68 In dealing with the access to and transfer of technology, the CBD provides:
Each Contracting Party, recognising that technology includes biotechnology, and that both access to and transfer of technology among Contracting Parties are essential elements for the attainment of the objectives of this Convention, undertakes subject to the provisions of this Article [16] to provide and/or facilitate access for and transfer to other Contracting Parties of technologies that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or make use of genetic resources and do not cause significant damage to the environment. 69 Where access to and transfer of technology are made to developing countries, 70 and the technology is 'subject to patents and other intellectual property rights, such access and transfer shall be provided on terms which recognize and are consistent with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights'. 71 For other countries (presumably developed countries), the access to and transfer of technology 'protected by patents and other intellectual property rights' in exchange for access to genetic resources must be 'in accordance with international law'. 72 In each instance however:
The Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other intellectual property rights may have an influence on the implementation of this [CBD] It 'shall be provided and/or facilitated under fair and most favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms where mutually agreed, and where necessary in accordance with the financial mechanism established by Articles 20 and 21': art 16(2); presumably this also includes the developing and least developed countries as distinguished by TRIPS art 66. 71 Article 16(2).
72
Article 16(3). subject to national legislation and international law in order to ensure that such rights are supportive of and do not run counter to its objectives. 73 The CBD Secretariat's early review of the impact of intellectual property rights on the CBD's objectives reinforced the view that intellectual property rights are a favoured mechanism for achieving access and the equitable sharing of the benefits of genetic resources. 74 However, subsequent analysis by various CBD and WTO/TRIPS emanations has been unable to articulate a coherent view about the interaction of intellectual property rights and the CBD, 75 and the analysis continues. 76 This impasse probably reflects the negotiating positions of the various member countries 77 -developing countries argued that strong patents hindered technology transfer and disregarded the contributions of family farmers and therefore these countries generally favoured restricting patents, 78 while developed countries argued that strong patents created incentives to conserve biodiversity by encouraging technology transfer, investment and development. 79 The likely outcome is that countries providing access to their genetic resources according to the CBD in exchange for access to and transfer of technology (from predominantly developed countries) will need to adopt and respect minimum standard intellectual property rights. 80 For Australia these standards are articulated as patents under the Patents Act and PBRs under the Plant Breeder's Rights Act that are consistent with the minimum standards required by TRIPS.
The internationally contested inherent conflicts between TRIPS and the CBD are that TRIPS requires genetic materials be protected by patents or sui generis plant 
79
UNEP/CBD/COP/3/23, above n 78, 4; eg, the United States declared: '[i]t is deeply regrettable to us that … a number of issues of serious concern in the United States have not been adequately addressed in the course of this negotiation. As a result, in our view, the test is seriously flawed in a number of important respects': WT/CTE/W/8, above n 78, Annex 5.
80
For a further analysis of this claim see Lawson and Downing, above n 50, 224.
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Volume 32 ____________________________________________________________________________________ variety rights and that this privately appropriates genetic resources over which a country has sovereign rights under the CBD, 81 and does not also require the additional measures set out in the CBD, such as prior informed consent and benefit-sharing. 82 A further concern is that patents over genetic materials and their applications appropriate genetic resources independently of the access scheme proposed by the CBD and that the benefits of these genetic resources are predominantly captured by non-resident rights holders. 83 However, the Conference of the Parties to the CBD ('COP') continues to develop and investigate practical measures to address access and benefit-sharing despite the interaction between the CBD and TRIPS remaining unresolved. 84 For example, the COP has adopted the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization ('Bonn Guidelines') 85 as voluntary guidelines to implementing the CBD provisions about access and benefitsharing. These guidelines are intended to apply to all genetic resources covered by the CBD (except human genetic resources), 86 apply in a manner that is 'coherent and mutually supportive of the work of relevant international agreements and institutions' 87 and be 'without prejudice' to the PGRFA Treaty. 88 The guidelines propose the establishment of a 'competent national authority' 89 and identify the responsibilities of Contracting Parties that are the origin of genetic resources and the implementation of mutually agreed terms. 90 The guidelines also set out the steps in the access and benefit-sharing process. 91 While these guidelines do not appear to favour a specific approach to intellectual property rights, they are consistent with the COP's view (together with the World Intellectual Property Organization, 92 the TRIPS Council 93 and the Australian government 94 among others) that contracts addressing intellectual property rights and other matters between the resource holder and the exploiter dealing with the access and benefit-sharing arrangements are preferable. 95 Despite these developments, significant concerns from the developing countries about the effect of intellectual property rights and equitably sharing the benefits remain unresolved. 96 Further, there are some significant limitations to the CBD's access scheme as it does not apply to ex situ collections before 29 December 1993 when the CBD entered into force 97 and it does not bind all countries (most notably the United States). 98 Thus access to these resources will require separate access negotiation with no agreed frameworks under the CBD.
The likely consequences for accessing materials under the CBD's scheme will be negotiating an access agreement with the resource holder in the country of origin according to the CBD and voluntary guidelines, an access agreement with the acquirer of those resources where access was in accordance with the CBD, or a separate access agreement with the resource holder where the resource is outside the scope of the CBD. In each instance, the use of the accessed materials and the use of subsequent improvements will be according to the terms of the access agreement. As these agreements can be expected to be predominantly between developed countries with technology that can use the genetic resources, intellectual property rights are likely to be consistent with, at least, the minimum standards required by TRIPS and favoured by the developed countries. The consequences of these arrangements for Australia's agricultural policy settings are considered further in Part 4. 
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CONCLUSIONS
Patents and PBRs are a blunt economic tool to promote investment in useful innovations and address innovation market failure. Their suitability to second-order developed economies, like Australia, is still open to speculation with consequences for the policy settings that might be adopted in implementing the intellectual property requirements of the PGRFA Treaty and CBD. Thus:
There are legitimate reasons to be concerned about the highly protective [patenting] standards that have emerged recently in the United States and the European Union. These laws and judicial interpretations provide broad patent protection for … biotechnological inventions … It remains to be seen whether such standards tilt the balance within those jurisdictions toward the private rights of inventors and away from the needs of competitors and users. It is not too early to claim that they are inappropriate for developing economies and net technology importers. 99 Significantly, Australia is a net technology importer, 100 and whilst its status as a developed country is certain, its economy is of a very different order to the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom, which are the first-order developed nations. 101 Further, analyses of patent grants between other developed countries (such as the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ('OECD'); see Table 3 ) and among Australia's major agricultural export destinations (see Table 4 ) shows that the United States and Japan patent considerably more than other countries. Significantly, of Australia's major agricultural export destinations, the United States holds the majority of non-resident patent grants (approximately 64 per cent) and non-resident PBR registration (approximately 51 per cent; see Table 5 ). Table I Patents. The data illustrate quantitatively that Japan and the United States are major export destinations for Australian agriculture and that those destinations are also the major patenters.
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Volume 32 ____________________________________________________________________________________ patent grants in Australia in 2000; Tables 3 and 5) and PBR registrations  (approximately 16 per cent in 2000; Tables 5 and 6 ) compared to other countries. In contrast, Japan is marked by a majority of resident patent grants (approximately 89 per cent; Table 3 ) and limited non-resident patenting (approximately 13 per cent of nonresident patent grants in Australia; Table 5 ). The United Kingdom and other OECD countries (see Tables 3 and 5 ) are in a similar position to Australia with the majority of patent grants to non-residents (between approximately 60 and 99 per cent; Table 3 ) and United States residents holding the majority of these non-resident grants. 102 In these circumstances the policy considerations about the place of intellectual property rights in Australian agriculture are different to those of the first-order developed countries (such as the United States and Japan). They are also different to those of developing and least developed countries. 103 Thus, the benefits and costs to Australia in implementing the PGRFA Treaty and the access and benefit-sharing scheme in the CBD are unlikely to be those of the first-order developed countries or the developing (or least developed) countries, but rather a compromise that reflects Australia's particular commercial and environmental interests. The particular interrelated issues that Australia faces are: (a)
Non-residents holding the majority of patents (see Table 3 ) and PBRs (see Table  6 ) in Australia, so residents can increasingly be expected to have to negotiate with non-resident rights holders (and most probably United States residents; see Tables 3 and 5 ) to access and use their protected useful plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and most importantly, the know-how and other technology to make and then use those protected genetic resources. These nonresident intellectual property rights reduce the likely economic benefit to Australia from agricultural exports as there will be further economic rents from patents and PBR royalties over accessed and used plant genetic resources for food and agriculture; (b)
The evolving market structures for global agriculture show a consolidation of corporations, 104 in particular the seed market, with real increases in seed prices in recent decades compared to yields. 105 Further, multi-national seed corporations relying on economies of scale are likely to undertake their variety development and seed production activities in a limited number of locations. 106 The effect of this market concentration is likely to be higher priced seeds and germplasm and directed to a limited number of crop and forage plants suited to environments of the major high value markets in North America and Europe; 105 See review in Rangnekar, above n 6, 13-14 (and the references therein).
(c)
As a consequence of market concentration, increasing patent holdings over plant genetic resources for food and agriculture in the earliest stages of crop and forage plant development have the potential to control the subsequent steps in the commercial exploitation of the new variety through vertical integration and restrictive contractual access practices. 107 Pro-competition measures that seek to limit the anti-competitive effects of vertical integration and restrictive practices are also unlikely to limit activities within the 'purpose and scope' of the patent or PBR in Australia. 108 Without the protection of effective pro-competition laws Australian agriculture can expect to pay higher prices and enjoy limited access, especially where Australian agricultural products might be competing against other markets also supplied by the same (or related) intellectual property rights holders;
As a further consequence of market concentration and the increased focus of those corporations on crops amenable to appropriation and developed for exclusive agro-ecological zones, the role of research in Australia to develop plant varieties suited to Australia's environment will be vital. It is uncertain that private sector research can or will develop varieties suitable to Australia's environment and its interests. Thus, public sector research is likely to be vital to developing new plant varieties from elite germplasm and these will incur additional expense and restrictions if the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture are not freely available; and (e)
The relatively few crop and forage plants with a high commercial value are likely to attract the major attention of those seeking to commercialise and dominate the particular commodity or niche markets of developed countries. The breeding effort undertaken by the increasingly consolidated agricultural corporations tends to be on a few high value crops amenable to appropriation and developed for exclusive agro-ecological zones. 109 With many and diffuse patents and PBRs over plants and plant varieties (including patent 'clustering' and 'bracketing'), 110 potential users will be required to determine the scope of uncertain rights and then negotiate successfully with all the relevant parties for products and processes that may not be best suited to Australia. This poses significant problems for Australian breeders and exporters as they will be required to negotiate access to develop new varieties whose products are likely to compete against the original rights holders in their domestic and foreign markets. Again, it is not certain that Australia's competition laws are adequate to ensure reasonable access and use of non-resident patented and PBRed plant genetic materials for food and agriculture. Table 6 Thus, the significant issue for developing new plant varieties for Australia's agricultural and environmental landscape is whether patent holders of plant varieties do in fact limit breeding, either expressly by refusing access to their invention, or in effect by breeders giving up or failing to commence new development where the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture are covered by patents. Unfortunately there is no evidence in Australia to address this issue, although there is experience in other related commercial endeavours in Australia where patents have deterred further innovation, 111 and some evidence that restricting patent scope may promote incremental, or follow-on innovation, that is beneficial for second-order economies like Australia. 112 Further there have been very limited policy analyses of the potential benefits of maintaining a distinction between the subject matter of patents and PBR 113 and ensuring access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture necessary for incremental plant breeding to meet Australia's particular circumstances. 114 The analysis of patent grants and PBR registrations in Australia by non-residents compared with Australia's major export destinations (see Table 5 ) also suggests Australia's interests might not favour strong patent and PBR rights unless there is proper disclosure through an adequate description and access to the necessary know-how to work the protected materials and processes to use those materials, and the patented technology does in practice improve agricultural efficiency and competitiveness. Without further analysis, the apparent assumption of Australia's negotiators of overall benefit from the intellectual property provisions in the PGRFA Treaty, and Australia's 
Volume 32 ____________________________________________________________________________________ adoption of the same stance as first-order developed countries, is open to question. This stance is also reflected in Australia's participation in the COP to the CBD and their implementations of the CBD's access requirements. 115 However, there is sufficient evidence available to suggest that the assumed benefits of plant and plant variety patenting may be interfering with plant breeding to warrant further policy analysis. 116 For example, an informal survey of public plant breeders in the United States showed significant difficulty in obtaining genetic stocks from private companies, impeded research, impeded release of new plant varieties and impeded student training, 117 and an econometric analysis of United States PBR legislation concluded the statutory rights served primarily as a marketing tool with little impact on excludability or appropriability, with no increase in private sector investment and no increase in experimental or commercial yields. 118 Australia's PGRFA Treaty stance might in fact lead to unnecessary costs on Australian agriculture and the failure to generate useful new varieties suited to Australia and its particular agricultural landscape. 119 Perhaps, most importantly, Australia's future agricultural landscape requires access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture including both inter-specific and intra-specific species diversity, 120 and the genetic diversity that may be accessed using modern genetic techniques. 121 These useful resources might be categorised for the purposes of crop and forage plant improvement by the techniques used to exploit the diversity: (a) _____________________________________________________________________________________ Modern genetic (or molecular biology) techniques -where there is the introduction of new genetic materials (from all sources) into an existing crop or forage plant variety. 122 This variety has often been classically (or conventionally) bred for desirable traits that are not presently susceptible to modern genetic techniques, such as increasing water use efficiency. This may also include the introduction of a desirable trait into crop and forage plants using modern genetic techniques followed by classical breeding techniques to exchange the introduced material into other (more favourable) background germplasms; and (b) (a) _____________________________________________________________________________________ Classical (or conventional) breeding techniques 123 -where there is genetic exchange between the germplasm (including the entire plant genome) of true biological species including all cultivated, wild and weedy forms of the crop and forage plant species. Hybrids are selected for desirable inherited traits that are often uncharacterised gene complexes that are not presently amenable to modern genetic techniques. While modern genetic techniques in this context are not used to exchange genetic materials, these techniques can assist in identifying and selecting desirable inherited traits (sometimes called assisted classical (or conventional) breeding). These useful plant genetic resources for food and agriculture reside in existing ex situ collections, where much of the elite germplasm of commercially valuable crop and forage plants has already been identified and enhanced for favourable characteristics through classical breeding techniques, and in the in situ high level intra-specific diversity that is predominantly maintained by farmers continuing to crop broadranging germplasm in developing countries. 124 Modern genetic techniques are also likely to be applied to these plant genetic resources for food and agriculture to reduce input agricultural costs (such as herbicide resistance, and so on) and confer specific desirable characters for high value markets (such as extended shelf-life, and so on). Put another way, the landscape is likely to require:
Bulk commodity crops that compete in the international arena on price -where developing plant varieties with increased yield (including maintaining yields in adverse environments, such as salt-degraded farm lands) and reduced input costs (such as pesticide and herbicide resistance) will depend on access to plant It is employed at intra-specific level, not at species level, and crosses and selects from a very wide range of varieties to create an improved genome. Characteristically, some tens of parent varieties are involved, over many years, each of which is itself the result of earlier generations of formal or informal breeding, and which already share most of their genomes. The product is again a variety, either released without intellectual property protection by the public sector, or when produced in the private sector, most frequently released under plant varietal protection (such as the UPOV system), where the object of protection is the variety, not the gene, and where, in fact, the so-called 'breeder's exemption' allows anyone -farmer or breeder -to use the genes within a protected variety. Individual resources infrequently provide largescale appropriable benefits. 124 Niche crops that compete on distinctiveness and quality -where developing new varieties (often minor crops targeted to identifiable high-value markets) will depend on access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture that exhibits diversity and market specific characteristics (such as colour, smell, exoticness, and so on); and Forage plants suited to Australia's agro-ecological zones -where developing improved forages that deal specifically with Australia's climate extremes, poor and degraded soils and pests will require access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture to suit Australia's particular environment. The challenge for Australia in negotiating intellectual property measures in agreements is to achieve an internationally agreed outcome that ensures access to these key genetic resources for food and agriculture. The options at their most basic are now:
The CBD has established an internationally agreed scheme, to which Australia is already bound, for access to all genetic resources except that some significant ex situ collections made before 29 December 1993 are excluded; and The PGRFA Treaty proposes to modify this scheme directed to particular plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and includes some significant ex situ collections made before 29 December 1993. The key issues are to determine whether a separate access scheme proposed by the PGRFA Treaty is beneficial to Australia and then whether Australia's best interests are in negotiating intellectual property restrictions on access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture within the Multilateral System. There seems little doubt that the PGRFA Treaty is beneficial. It provides a simple and guaranteed scheme to access important ex situ collections (such as the CGIAR collections and their elite germplasm stocks) and other important in situ resources without the unregulated commercial negotiation, or complex regulation provided for in the CBD. This is likely to assist countries like Australia to avoid many of the negotiation complexes over privately appropriated plant genetic resources for food and agriculture held by non-residents. However, the likely benefit from Australia's stance in the negotiated intellectual property provisions is unclear, and has the potential to impose significant costs on Australian agriculture in the future.
As a result of the intellectual property provisions presently favoured by Australia, much of the useful plant genetic resources for food and agriculture that would have been freely available is likely to be subject to broadly claimed patents and PBRs held by non-residents and no longer freely available. The stark effect of the patent's and PBR's 'exclusive rights' is to remove that material from the public domain and so from the PGRFA Treaty's Multilateral System, for the term of the patent or PBR with very minimal changes. For PBRs this is ameliorated to some extent by an experimental use and breeding new variety exemptions. 125 These 'exclusive rights', and in particular the patent's 'exclusive rights', have significant consequences for Australia as the possible market failure for Australia's agricultural future is that private firms in the first-order developed countries (in particular the United States, see Tables 3-6) will seek to commercialise their protected developed plants and plant varieties with minimal changes and broad claims. This is likely to prevent or impede (through commercial barriers such as high costs, refusals to supply, and so on) the essential use and development of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture that are best suited to Australia's commercial interests and environment. Further, potential contributors of new plant genetic resources for food and agriculture to the Multilateral System are unlikely to have confidence in a scheme that appropriates their resources. 126 If these analyses are correct, then Australia's stance in negotiating the implementation of the PGRFA Treaty is probably best served by seeking to make the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture accessed from the Multilateral System, and subsequent developments of those materials, continue to be freely available. In other words, Australia should seek to keep plant genetic resources for food and agriculture accessed from the Multilateral System and subsequent improvements of those materials free from the privately appropriating effects of the patent's and PBR's 'exclusive rights'. Without this access, in second-order economies like Australia, where the majority of technology is imported, this is likely to undermine the needs of competitors and technology users 127 and promote under-investment in necessary innovation to suit Australia's particular commercial and environmental circumstances. 128 
